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In the midst of a natural gas shortage, steadily increasing oil
prices, and severe inflation of the costs of constructing new electri-
cal generating stations, Americans received one bit of good news:
a study for the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA) has found that solar heating is competitive with
other energy sources in many parts of the United States.' One sec-
tor of the business community may not have greeted this news with
enthusiasm. Public utilities, which currently provide a substantial
portion of the energy used to heat buildings, could lose a great deal
if solar-powered heating systems become widespread. Although it
seems unlikely solar energy use could grow quickly enough to re-
duce the demand on existing powerplants,' it would undoubtedly
shrink future needs.
Moreover, the use of electricity by solar building owners as a
back-up source of energy could disrupt utility load curves. Load fac-
tors represent the ratio of the average amount of utility capacity
in use, to the highest output over a given period.3 A utility customer
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1. MITRE CORP., AN ECONO.MIC ANALYSIS OF SOLAR WATER AND SPACE HEATINC. (pre-
pared for ERDA, M76-79, Nov. 1976) (written by G. Bennington, M. Bohannon &P. Spewak
of MITRE Corp.).
2. Space heating accounts for only ahout 20% of national energy needs, and no authori-
ties expect that solar energy is likely to contrihute more than half of this amount, even
assuming aggressive government support. before V0. RSe OFFICE OF TECH. AssESSMENT,
U.S. CONGRESS, COM\PARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TFIE 1976 ERDA PLAN AND PROGRAM 119-20
(1976). ERDA has set a qoid of only 10% incorporation of solar energy systems in new
building starts for 1985. EIDA, NATIONAL PROGRAIM FOR SOLAR HEFATING AND COOLING, Doc.
No'. 23A, at 9 (1975). For in at'sess'ment by a solar industry representative, see S. Butt,
Solar Market Capture and Market Penetration: Solar Heating and Cooling (Oct. 5, 1976)
(unpublished paper on file with the authors).
3. S. FELDMAN & U. ANI'FIS:)N, THE PIBIiC UTILITY AND SOLAR ENFPRY TNTEIFACI :
AN ASSESSMENT OF rTo.iCv OPTIONS 47-48 (prepiared for ERI).A Cont. No. E (49-18)
-2523, 1976) [hereinafter eited as PUiIC .'Ti.ITV AND SOLAR ENERGY INTE RKACE]. See iilsi
E. BERLIN, C. CiCCIiETTi & \V. GIL.EN, PERSPECTIVF ON Poweit 29-31 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as PERSPECTIVE ON POuvi.u] ; R. MOR;AN & S. JARABECK, HOW TO CHALLENGE YOUR
LOCAL ELECTRIC UTILITY 57 (1974).
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with occasional or infrequent needs causes the load factor to drop,
meaning that the capacity required to serve that customer often lies
idle. Since even idle capacity must be paid for, the cost of serving
the occasional user may be higher than the cost of serving a customer
who uses the same amount of electricity, but has a steady demand.
Depending on the size of the solar user's collector and storage ca-
pacity, his need for electric heating will generally occur only when
the weather is unusually severe or cloudy. This may cause the solar
user with electrical backup to fall into the higher cost group. Al-
though the battle has hardly begun, one utility has already tried to
retaliate by imposing a rate structure that reflects the potentially
higher costs of serving solar customers.
4
On the other hand, some utilities may seen an opportunity to prof-
it from participation in the solar energy market. Natural gas com-
panies may soon have to locate alternative sources of energy because
gas reserves are steadily declining.5 At least one gas company has
has already begun experiments with solar-assisted gas heating sys-
tems.6
Utility decisions like the above could help determine the rate at
which solar energy is utilized-if at all. Utilities are powerful insti-
tutions in the energy market, with many weapons in their arsenal.
This article will address some of the important issues emerging from
the relationship of utilities to solar energy, and will focus on the
regulatory process within which those issues will be decided.
II. UTILITY REGULATION: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
Over seventy-five percent of the electrical generating capacity in
the United States is the property of private power companies.7 Al-
though these companies are privately owned, their operations are
regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs) because of the
"natural monopoly" nature of the utility business. The general con-
sensus is that it would be counterproductive to have competing elec-
trical generating and transmission systems in the same area.
8
4. The Public Service Co. of Colorado cited the increasing use of. solar heating as one
justification for a controversial new rate structure it had requested. See text accompanying
note 64 infra.
5. See generally 1Rosenburg, Conservation by Gas Utilities as a Gas Supply Option,
PUBLIC UTIL. FORT., Jan. 20, 1977, at 13. The validity of claims that proved gas reserves
are declining is currently the subject of intense controversy. See, e.g., Miller, Natural Gas:
The Hidden Reserves, Vashington Post, Feb. 13, 1977, § c, at 1.
6. Solar assisted gas energy (SAGE) is the name of a project of the Southern Cali-
fornia Gas Co. See PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLIAR ENERGY INTERFACE, supra note 3 at 22; Hirsh-
berg, Public Policy for Solar Heating and Cooling, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTIST, Oct. 1976, at
37-40. A recent survey found over 100 utility projects involving solar energy, most of
them in the area of heating and cooling buildings. ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., 3 SOLAR
ENERGY INTELLIGENCE REPORT 19 (Jan. 31, 1977).
7. Public PoIwer, PUBLIC POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 28.
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-S25 (1970), as onended, (Supp. III 1973). See generally PERSPEC-
TIVfl ON POWER, supra1 note 3, at 52-79; Stoel, Energy, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
928 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
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A. FEDERAL REGULATION
Federal jurisdiction over utilities is limited primarily to regula-
tion of the wholesale rates of interstate sales of electricity, and the
siting of hydroelectric plants. 9 However, the Federal Power Com-
mission (FPC) does set accounting standards and reporting require-
ments that are valuable sources of information. 10 The FPC has gen-
erally been conservative in its policies. For example, it rarely sup-
ports legislation to expand its jurisdiction or increase its involve-
ment in utility rate making.1'
Recent regulations issued by the FPC on filing rate schedules
offer some hope for a more active energy conservation program. 12
The Commission announced recognition of the shift in public concern
for the "proper utilization and conservation of our natural resources
including fuels and raw materials as well as air, water and land,"
although action reflecting these concerns was left for a later date.13
Utilities were asked to submit more detailed rate reports includ-
ing "a complete explanation as to the method used in arriving at the
cost of service allocated to the sales and service for which the
rate or charge is proposed, and showing the principal determinants
used for allocation purposes.' ' x4
Recent congressional proposals would also expand federal reg-
ulation of utilities.' 5 One proposal, for example, would dictate per-
missible rates and other essential utility policies.' While Congress
almost certainly has the power to regulate utilities under the com-
merce clause,' 7 or on grounds of national security, 8 it seems likely
that the states will continue to exercise primary responsibility for
utility practices.
9. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(c), 817 (1970); id. §§ 824-837h (1970), as amended.
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 825, 825(c) (1970).
11. PERSECTIVE ON POWER, supra note 3, at 60-72; 2 A. KAHN, THE EcoNoMics OF RcU-
LATION 76 (1970-71) (2 Vols.) ; Breyer & MacAvoy, The Federal Power Commission aend
the Coordination Problem in the Electrical Power Industry, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 695-701
(1973).
12. 40 Fed. Reg. 48,673 (Oct. 18, 1975).
13. Id. at 48,674 (Oct. 18, 1975).
14. Id. (codified in 18 C.F.R. § 35.12(5) (1976).
15. E.g., H.R. Res. No. 12461, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See Samuelson, Battle Lines
Are Beiiig Generated for Reform of Electric Utility Rates, NAT'L J., Oct. 16, 1976, at 1474.
Willard, Electric Power: The Struggle Over Controls, Washington Post, Aug. 8, 1976, §
C, at 3.
16. Willard, supra note 15.
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
18. A possible limitation on the power of Congress, however, was suggested by the Su-
preme Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). The Court held
that federal regulation of wages paid by state governments to their employees constituted
an unconstitutional infringement on state sovereignty. Id. at 2474.
The Court also granted certiorari in a Clean Air Act case testing the limits of
federal authority to order indirect source controls such as parking bans and automobile
inspection programs. Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 2224 (1976).
Direct federal regulation of utilities would not be affected by these cases, but pro-
posals to require state programs could be.
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B. STATE REGULATION
State public utility commissions have generally acted as over-
seers rather than initiators of policy. However, this may be chang-
ing in some states19 due partly to the regulatory principle that man-
agement decisions are best made by the utility, limited only by broad
public interest principles. Also, as a practical matter, utility commis-
sions have often lacked the resources and staff to take an aggres-
sive posture. The Colorado PUC, for example, has only fourteen pro-
fessionals, which is fewer than those available to one large utility.
However, it should be noted that in most states there is no legisla-
tive barrier to utility commissions undertaking more assertive pro-
grams, and some PUC's have become more active in recent years.
2 0
From the standpoint of solar energy use, the crucial regulatory
function is rate approval. Typically, regulatory agencies first decide
how much a utility will be allowed to earn, and then approve rate
schedules designed to produce that approved profit margin.21 The
rate of return is a function of the rate base-those investments
on which the utility may make a profit. Operating expenses (in-
cluding fuel costs), taxes, and other noncapital costs are then added,
to determine the utility's total revenue needs. A utility's decision
to market or lease solar collectors would have to be approved by the
utility commission before these expenses could be added to the
rate base. It should also be noted that the utility profits only if it
makes an investment in capital. Therefore, a utility might finance the
purchase of solar collectors by homeowners, but it would lose the bene-
fits of depreciation and of an increase in its rate base.
Rate structures are also designed to reflect different costs of
service. For example, residential consumers have traditionally paid
higher rates than large industrial customers because of the lower
costs of billing and metering a single large user. Industries willing
to accept interruptible service, that is, the possibility of service cut-
offs during peak periods, also receive a lower rate.
Challenging a public utility position is often expensive and
difficult. Utility presentations to a regulatory commission are a busi-
ness expense; consumer groups and energy conservationists rarely
have access to equal resources. For instance, a recent estimate
19. Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1480. See also R. MORGAN & S. JARABEK, supra note 3,
at 65-70.
20. Statement of Toni Golden quoted in [1976] ENERGY REP. (BNA) A-25. As an
example of more assertive regulation, generic hearings on rate structure reform have been
initiated in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. Id. at A-27.
21. PERSPECTIVE ON POWER, supra note 3, at 59.
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found that the Virginia Electric Power Company alone spends about
$250,000 on a single rate hearing.2 2 Once the regulatory agency makes
its decision, judicial review is usually very limited, in deference
to administrative expertise on technical issues. Although many
cases can be cited where courts remanded decisions for lack of sub-
stantial evidence, 23 the burden is clearly on the challenger.
There is one major exception to the scope of utility commission
jurisdiction: publicly owned utilities are usually exempt from state
jurisdiction because they are already publicly controlled. Some
utility critics view locally owned utilities as one alternative to the
unresponsiveness of privately owned systems. 24 Whether or not this
argument is valid, it appears that in the short run municipal utili-
ties are too small to play a major role in national energy issues.
In 1972 municipal utilities accounted for only ten percent of total in-
stalled capacity.
2 5
Within the broad regulatory process outlined above, several princi-
pal issues should be discussed as they relate to solar energy. The
sections that follow consider three general topics: service and rate
discrimination; scope of PUC jurisdiction and its consequences for
solar users; and utility participation in the solar market.
III. RATE AND SERVICE DISCRIMINATION
26
A crucial question relating to solar energy is whether utilities
may discriminate in their rates and service in ways that either favor
or hinder the development of solar heating and cooling. At one ex-
treme, public utilities could refuse to provide any backup service on
cloudy days. At the other extreme, the utilities could refuse certain
services to customers who did not install solar equipment. Which-
ever direction the discrimination cuts, the legal question is the same:
may a public utility provide services and rates which treat solar cus-
tomers differently from other customers?
A. STATE ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
One of the major purposes of public regulation of electric utili-
22. Kast, Va. Consumers Defeated Twice-In Just 10 Minutes, Washington Star, Jan.
26, 1977, § B, at 1.
23. E.g., Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Town of Hatfield, 219 Ark. 515, 243 S.W.2d
378 (1951). See generally 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 744-46 (2 vols.).
24. Utilities and Solar Energy: Will They Own the Sun?, PEOPLE & ENERGY, Oct. 1976, at
2; Northcross, Who Will Own the Sun?, THE PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1976, at 14-16.
25. Public Power, PUBLIC POWER, Jan.-Feb. 1975, at 28.
26. The analysis in these sections draws heavily from existing treatises on public utility
regulation, particularly A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969) (2
vols.) ; G. TURNER, TRENDS AND Topics IN UTILITY REGULATION (1969). FOr an extremely
lucid discussion of the economic issues raised by utility regulation, see A. KAHN, supra
note 11. For a review of more recent developments, see PERSPECTIVE ON POWER, supra
note 3.
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ties is the prevention of unreasonable discrimination or undue pref-
erences. Nearly every state has a statute prohibiting conduct that
favors one class of customers while harming another. Typical of these
statutes is New Jersey's:
No public utility shall:
a. Make, impose or exact any unjust or unreasonable,
unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential individual
or joint rate, commutation rate, mileage and other special
rate, toll, fare, charge or schedule for any product or serv-
ice supplied or rendered by it within this state;
b. Adopt or impose any unjust or unreasonable classi-
fication in the making or as the basis of any individual or
joint rate, toll, fare, charge or schedule for any product or
service rendered by it within this state.
No public utility shall make or give, directly or indirect-
ly, any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to
any person, locality or particular description of traffic,
or subject any particular person, locality or particular de-
scription of traffic to any prejudice or disadvantage.
27
Such antidiscrimination statues only proscribe discrimination
that is "unreasonable," "unjust," "undue," or "unlawful. ' 28 Wheth-
er a particular utility rate or service unlawfully discriminates i's a
question of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the
state utility commission. 9 It is, therefore, very difficult to predict
how any given discriminatory practice will be dealt with.
In general, the cases and state utility decisions suggest that utili-
ties have substantial freedom to treat different classes of custom-
ers differently. For example, large industrial users of electric-
ity often receive special low promotional rates-a discriminatory
practice defended on the ground that it costs the utility less to serve
very large customers. 30 Many states have permitted their utilities
to grant special promotional rates or other considerations to attract
new industries to the state and thereby reduce the unit cost of power
for all electricity consumers. 31 Such promotional considerations have
included payments to customers who install electric heating, un-
usually large residential capacity, electric water heaters, electric
appliances or electric wiring. These considerations have also in-
cluded the subsidization of the installation of wiring, piping, and un-
derground service for select customers.
Only two general principles have emerged from the reported
27. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-1 (1969) ; id. § 48:3-4 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
28. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 26, at 286-88.
29. Id.
30. E.g., Re Pacif~c Gas & Elec. Co., 9 P.U.R.3d 97 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n. 1955).
31. See, e.g., Gifford v. Central Maine Power Co., 217 A.2d 200 (Me. 1966) Re City
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decisions. The first is that a discriminatory practice is more likely
to be found reasonable if it produces indirect benefits to all custom-
res.32 This principle would favor discrimination that benefits solar
systems if such discrimination would reduce rates for all customers
by reducing the utility's needs for capital equipment and fuel. Some
decisions have gone even farther by suggesting that for a discrimi-
natory practice to be unreasonable or unjust it must not only benefit
one class of customers, but must also burden another class.33 Under
those.decisions a practice that assists solar owners without burdening
other customers is more likely to be found reasonable.
A second principle that emerges from the cases is that utilities
may treat different classes of customers in different ways if there
is a reasonable basis for distinguishing them . 4 Thus, if there is a
reasonable basis for distinguishing solar customers from other cus-
tomers-as there almost certainly is-then solar customers may
be charged different rates and may receive different services. The
basis for such a distinction might be the unpredictable nature of the
demand for electricity by solar customers, their use of less electricity
than other residential customers, or the ability of solar customers to
use their storage facilities to control the time of day they demand
power.
Regardless of whether a particular discriminatory practice is
unlawful, if solar customers feel they are victims of unreasonable
discrimination, for example, through the utility's refusal to provide
them with backup power service, they may find it extremely diffi-
cult to obtain relief. Public utility commission hearings can be long
and expensive, Also, utility commissions have broad discretion to
determine what is, and is not discriminatory. 5 Another problem is
that customers can seek help in the courts only after exhausting their
administrative remedies.3 6 Once in court, the customers must bear
Ice & Fuel Co., 260 App. Div. 537, 23 N.Y.S.2d- 376 (1940); Re Promotional Practices of
Electric & Gas Utils., 65 P.U.R.3d 405 (Conn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966); Re Delaware
Power & Light Co., 56 P.U.R.3d 1 (Del. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1964); Superior Propane Co.
v. South Jersey Gas Co., 60 P.U.R.3d 217 (N.J. Bd. Pub. Util. Comm'rs 1965); Re Promo-
tional Activities by Gas & Electric Co's, 68 P.U.R.3d 163 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1967) ;
Virginiat State Corp. Comm'n v. Appalachian Power Co., 65 P.U.R.3d 283 (Va. Corp.
Comm'n 1966). See also Oklahoma v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 9 P.U.R.4th 369 (Okla.
Sup. Ct. 1975). But utility commissions have not been reluctant to strike down promo-
tional practices found to be of little value to the utility or the bulk of its customers. Re
Southwest Gas Corp., 61 P.U.R.3d 467 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n. 1965) ; Re Carolina Power
& Light Co., 52 P.U.R.3d 469, (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1964); Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 67
P.U.R.3d 417 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1967).
32. E.g., Rossi v. Garton, 88 N.J. Super. 233, 211 A.2d 806, 60 P.U.R.3d 210 (1965). See
also Memorandum: Legal and Regulatory Analysis of Conservation Proposal for the Fed-
eral Energy Administration, Energy Resource Development 14 (Dec. 8, 1976) (law firm
of Belnap, McCarthy, Spencer, Sweeny & Harkway) (on file with the authors).
33. E.g., California Portland Cement Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 12 P.U.R.3d 482, 485-96
(Cal. Pub. Util. Conm'n 1955). 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 26, at 295, 300-02.
34. E.g., Hicks v. City of Monroe Util. Comm'n, 237 La. 848, 112 So. 2d 635, 29 P.U.R.3d
275 (1959). See also 1 A. PRTEST, sitpra note 26, at 288.
35. See Pittsburgh v. Public Util. Comm'n, 168 Pa. Super. Ct. 95, 78 A.2d 35 (1951).
36. Smith v. Southern Union Gas Co., 58 N.M. 197, 269 P.2d 745 (1954) ; Ten, Ten Lin-
coln Place, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 273 App. Div. 903, 77 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1948).
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the burden of proving a given practice discriminatory. " This bur-
den is difficult to meet. A utility commiission's findings will gen-
erally be upheld if the record of its proceedings shows a substantial
basis for its findings.
3 8
B. FEDERAL ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
State antidiscrimination statutes are not the only bar to discrimi-
natory practices by utilities. The federal antitrust laws may also
outlaw rates or services that single out the owners of solar energy
systems for special treatment. It is now clear that the antitrust
exemption for state action will not totally immunize public utilities
from antitrust liability. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held
that a privately owned public utility is not exempt from possible
antitrust liability when it furnishes its customers light bulbs with-
out charge.3 9 The state action antitrust exemption was found not to
apply, although the light bulb promotional practice had been ap-
proved by the state public utility commission as part of the utility's
rate structure and could be discontinued only with the PUC's per-
mission. In reaching its holding the Court noted that "state authori-
zation, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive pri-
vate conduct confers no antitrust immunity."
40
There are several grounds on which utility discrimination toward
solar heating and cooling could be deemed anticompetitive, and
therefore a violation of antitrust laws. Perhaps the most obvious
ground is when the utility refuses to provide backup service to solar
customers. When protection of the utility's monopoly position is the
reason for such a refusal, there may be a violation of the Sherman
Act's prohibition against monopolies and attempts to creat monopo-
lies.41 An antitrust violation might also be found if a utility subsi-
dizes its entrance into the solar heating and cooling market by dis-
tributing its losses across all utility customers, giving it an
overwhelming advantage.42 Finally, a utility's use of rate dis-
37. E.g., North Carolina ex rel Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 250 N.C.
421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959) ; 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 26, at 324-25.
38 iChicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 223 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
39. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
40. Id. at 3116.
41. Refusals to deal with solar customers would be a classic violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act which provides that:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1974). See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S.
366 (1972), where a public utility was found to have violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by refusing to sell electricity to a municipally operated utility distribution system.
42. Such conduct could be viewed as temporary price cutting to put rival solar firms out
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crimination to favor or hinder solar heating and cooling is
arguably a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.4 3 That Act de-
clares illegal the practice of requiring some purchasers to pay
more for commodities of like grade and quality if such discrimina-
tion tends to lessen competition or create a monopoly.
4
There may also be constitutional restraints on the ability of a
utility to discriminate for or against solar systems. If a state utility
commission approves a discriminatory practice, it may violate the
federal constitution's command of equal protection.45 However, un-
der recent readings of that constitutional provision, a state has sub-




An extremely important service discrimination issue is whether
a public utility can refuse to provide backup electricity for struc-
tures with solar heating or cooling systems. The short answer is that
it appears a utility may not, unless it can demonstrate a compelling
case that backup service would cause substantial harm to the util-
of business. See Puerto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1929). Or, it might be viewed as an illegal tying arrangement in situations
where a solar customer's receipt of favorable treatment is conditioned on, his acceptance of
the utility service. Tying arrangements are another classic antitrust violation. See 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1970); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1970).
44. The Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either
or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce,
where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the
United States . . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce, or to injure, de-stroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for difference in the
cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or de-
livered. . . . And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall pre-
vent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce
from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in re-
straint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing con-
ditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
46. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in
enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
Id. at 425-26.
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ity's existing customers. Refusal to provide service would not only
transgress the federal antitrust laws and the antidiscrimination stat-
utes discussed above, but it would violate the utility's common law
and statutory duty to provide utility service.
The basic concept of a public utility is an entity that has dedi-
cated its property to serve the public without discrimination.4 7 Al-
most every state has a statutory provision requiring utilities to "fur-
nish adequate and safe service, ' 48 "provide such service, instru-
mentalities, and facilities as shall be safe and adequate and in all
respects just and reasonable,''49 or "furnish reasonably adequate
service and facilities. ' 50 The Supreme Court enunciated the under-
lying purpose of these statutes in the following terms:
Corporations which devote their property to a public use
may not pick and choose, serving only the portions of the
territory covered by their franchises which it is presently
profitable for them to serve, and restricting the development
of the remaining portions by leaving their inhabitants in dis-
comfort without the service which they alone can render. 51
Of course, the duty to provide adequate service has some lim-
its. Utilities will be excused from providing service when prevented
from doing so by acts of God, labor disputes, and shortages of fuel
supply.5 2 Although there is substantial precedent to the contrary,5 3
in some cases utilities have been excused from providing service
when to do so would be unusually expensive.5 4
As with most issues in public utility regulation, the "duty to
serve" requirement is interpreted on a case-by-case basis with "rea-
sonableness" and the "public interest" as the touchstones. In the
case of backup service for solar heating and cooling systems, the
public interest probably demands that the utilities provide service.
The major argument against providing backup service is that it re-
quires the utility to build and maintain expensive peaking equipment
that would only be used infrequently, for example, when cloudy peri-
ods have drained the storage facilities of solar structures, and the
solar owners are consequently demanding power simultaneously with
47. For a general discussion of a utility's duty to serve, see Hodel & Wendel, The Ditty
and Responsibility of Oregon Public Agencies to Provide Adequate and Sufficient Electrical
Utility Service, 54 ORE. L. REv. 539-50 (1975) Note, Utility's Duty to Serve, 62 COLU.
L. REV. 312 (1962).
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.020 (1975).
49. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1955), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1976).
50.. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 196.03(1) (1957).
51. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917).
52. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 26, at 237-38.
53. E.g., Corporation Comm'n v. Southern Pac. Co., 55 Ariz. 173, 99 P.2d 702 (1940).
54. E.g., Re Union Elec. Co. of Mo., 90 P.U.R.(N.S.) 194. (Mo. Pub. Util. Comin'n
1950); Re Billings Gas Co., 26 P.U.R.(N.S.) 328 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1938); Re
New York Tel. Co., 37 P.U.R.(N.S.) 173 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1941).
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peak demand from other customers. This argument appears to be of
little consequence, since utilities can condition the receipt of solar
backup power on the installation of equipment that will draw power
from the utility only during n'onpeak periods. Even if such a con-
dition did not eliminate the peak demand induced by solar customers,
the public interest in fuel conservation might justify the enforcement
of the duty to serve.
How will the duty to serve affect discrimination in favor of so-
lar customers? In particular, can a gas company refuse to provide
gas connections to new residences that do not install solar heating
and cooling equipment? All indications are that such a discrimina-
tory practice would be viewed as reasonable. Present natural gas
shortages present a strong argument for conditioning the receipt of
gas on the implementation of various conservation measures. Some
states have taken measures to restrict gas to certain customers or
to eliminate its availability for some uses. For example, New York
banned the use of gas in swimming pools and in buildings without
adequate insulation. 55 A few states have banned the use of gas in
decorative lighting.5 6
D. RATE DISCRIMINATION
Utility rate structures have recently become a political is-
sue.57 At rate hearings across the country, utility regulators have
become the arbiters of the merits of different, extremely complex
theories for utility pricing. The major participants in this debate,
in addition to the utilities themselves, are industrial, consumer, and
environmental representatives. As a special subgroup of consumers,
solar energy users also have a great deal at stake.
1. Types of Rate Structures
A relatively simple example helps to demonstrate the importance
of this relationship. A homeowner considering a solar system is told
he can expect to reduce his annual outside energy consumption by
seventy percent. The homeowner purchases the system and it per-
forms as promised. However, the homeowner finds that his utility
bills have dropped far less than expected, and his total dollar say-
55. National Swimming Pool Inst. v. Kohn, 80 Misc. 2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 747, 9 P.U.R.
4th 237 (1974) ; New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Case 26286 (Apr. 16. 1974). See also Ban
on Heated Pools Leaves Californians Boiling, New York Times, Feb. 5, 1976, at 33.
56. Leroy Fantasies, Inc. v. Swidler. 44 App. Div. 2d 266, 354 N.Y.S.2d 182, 4 P.U.R.
4th 334 (1974), appeal denied, 34 N.Y.2d 519, 316 N.E.2d 884 (1974) ; Colorado Pub. Util.
Comm'n, Decision No. 87640 (Oct. 21, 1975).
57. See generally Bigger Electric Bills Ahead for Big Business, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov.
29, 1976, at 55. Several periodicals are devoted exclusively to utility issues. For example,
Public Utilities Fortnightly emphasizes the utility perspective and Power Line presents an
environmentally oriented view.
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ings amount to only fifty percent. The difference is attributable to a
declining block rate schedule, which imposes a higher fee for the
first block purchased. This pricing system is the most common rate
structure for residential customers, and it was designed to encour-
age long-run growth in demand.
5 8
Another common utility rate structure provides a lower price to
all-electric customers. This practice is essentially a holdover from
the days of competition between gas- and electric companies for new
business. At the time such rates were adopted, growth was a
source of declining costs, and therefore benefited all a utility's
customers. Although this situation no longer exists, the all-electric
rate structure continues in many places.5 9 The current justification
by utilities is that the demand imposed by all-electric users is large-
ly offpeak, that is, when the demands on the utility's capacity are
1ow.
60 This rate might be denied to homeowners using the utility to
back up a solar system, leading to higher than expected costs for
service.6'
Some utilities also provide standby or breakdown service to cus-
tomers whose entire electrical requirements are not regularly sup-
plied by the utility. 2 Although under current definitions this rate
would not apply to customers using solar energy strictly for heating
and cooling, future solar technologies that use solar energy to gen-
erate electricity would be affected. 63 Utilities may argue that the
rationale for standby service-the irregular and unpredictable nature
of the customer's demand-also applies to solar energy users, and
that they should therefore be included in this category. Since such
service may include a high minimum monthly charge, the impact
on solar users would be adverse.
From the standpoint of the utility company, the solar energy
58. PERSPECTIVE ON POWER, suepras note 3, at chaps. 1-3.
59. For example, general residential service rates for service from the Public Service Co.
of Colorado are:
$1.50 for first 30 kwh or less
3.708c per kwh for next 70 kwh or less
2.928c per kwh for next 900 kwh or less
1.958c per kwh all additional kwh
The rates for residential service, all-electric homes are:
$6.67 for first 200 kwh or less
2.938c per kwh for next 800 kwh or less
1.958c per kwh all additional kwh
Thus, the all-electric customer is given a small advantage. FEDERAL POWER OOMM'N, NA-
TIONAL ELECTRIC RATE BOOK: COLORADO 3 (Aug. 1975). Rate books are published for ea.h
state and are updated periodically.
60. Letter insert in monthly bill from Potomac Electric Power Co., Washington, D.C.
to its customers (Jan. 1977).
61. In conversations with officials at the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion, the authors were told that denials of all-electric rates to solar users have already
occurred.
62. E.g., Southern California Edison, Rate Schedule S: Standby (June 1, 1964) (on file
with the Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Sheet No. 3598-E).
63. For a description of technologies for generating electricity from solar energy, see
W. CLARK, ENERGY FOR SURVIVAL 383-95 (1974)'.
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user is a rather special customer. The usual residential consum-
er varies his demand with the outside temperature. This demand
may vary considerably with the seasons, but the general range and
timing are relatively predictable. In contrast, most solar buildings
will use their backup systems only occasionally, after a cloudy pe-
riod or severe weather. If the utility has' to maintain capacity to
meet this infrequent demand, the costs of serving the solar custom-
ers may not be covered by prevalent rates. Of course, this assumes
the solar user requires auxiliary service when the utility is operat-
ing at peak, an issue addressed below.
The possibility of conflict between solar energy users and util-
ities has already surfaced in Colorado. Public Service Company, a
Colorado utility, requested a rate schedule for new residential cus-
tomers designed in part to capture the extra costs imposed by so-
lar heated dwellings.6 4 The proposed rate schedule was a demand/
energy rate, which has two components: an energy charge, reflec-
ting the total kilowatt-hours used, and a demand charge, based on
the maximum kilowatt demand during any fifteen minutes. The
theory underlying this division is that the demand charge reflects
the cost of generating capacity, as opposed to the cost of the fuel
used to serve the customer. This rate structure has traditionally
been used for large commercial and industrial customers whose de-
mand was considered high enough to justify the added costs of me-
tering.
Solar energy advocates testifying before the Colorado Public
Utility Commission were extremely critical of the demand charge
concept.6 5 They contended that the impact on solar users would be
devastating since the occasional user would pay a relatively high
charge for any occasional demand, despite very low amounts of total
energy consumption. One calculation indicated that a solar system
which provides seventy percent of heating needs would reduce the
homeowner's electric bill thirty-five percent under the existing de-
clining block rate, but only fifteen percent under the demand charge.6
The economics of solar energy are presently marginal in most places,
so this difference, it was contended, might discourage consumers
from installing a solar system.
Solar advocates also attacked the demand charge concept in the
64. Testimony of James H. Ranniger, Manager of Rates and Regulation for the Public
Service Co. of Colorado, Colorado Public Utilities Comm. Investigation and Suspension
Docket No. 935, at 14 (Sept. 22, 1975).
65. Testimony of Dr. Ernst Habict, Jr. and Dr. William Vickrey for the Environmental
Defense Fund, at the Colorado Public Utilities Comm. Investigation and Suspension Docket
No. 935 (Sept. 22, 1975). See generally Mills, Denmtand for Electric Rates: A New Prob-
lem and Challenge for Solar Heating, 19 AM. Soc'y HEATING, REFRIG. & AIR CONDITIONING
ENG. J. 42 (1977).
66. Mills, supra note 65, at 42. The solar system would save more of the entire bill but
for the nonheating demands of electricity for appliances.
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Public Service Company case by questioning whether the demand
from solar heated buildings was likely to coincide with the utility's
peak period; if not, no capacity charge was justified. Several studies
have attempted to answer this question by simulating the performance
of .solar heated buildings, and by comparing their needs for backup
energy with utility load curves.67 One recent study examined six dif-
ferent utilities and concluded as follows:
No general statement can be made. . . . This analysis must
be performed on an individual utility basis, since variations
in the ambient weather conditions, load curves, and genera-
tion mixes of utilities will be the prime determinants in the
magnitude of the impact.
68
The same studies have also noted the importance of thermal energy
storage systems as a potentially significant factor. A simple rock
bed or water tank, for example, might easily store a day's worth
of heating needs. An appropriately designed building with an ade-
quate storage system could always be served off-peak.
6 9
As an alternative approach that would be fair to both home-
owners and the utility, solar advocates testifying before the C1-
orado Public Utility Commission supported tilme-of-day pricing.
Time-of-day rate structures charge more for power consumed dur-
ing peak periods and less during other hours, such as late at night.
A homeowner with an energy storage system, whether or not he
also had a solar unit, could buy energy during off-peak times, but
use it to provide heat during peak periods. The argument is com-
plicated by questions about the added cost of time-of-day meters and
utility claims that present off-peak periods are needed to allow for
maintenance.
The Colorado Public Utility Commission initially granted the
67. Results of these studies are summarized in PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLAR ENERGY INTER-
FACE, supra note 3, and MITRE CORP. ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES STUDY OF THE INTERFACE
BETWEEN SOLAR AND WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES (prepared for the Fed.
Energy Comm'n, Tech. Rep. 7431, draft, Dec. 20, 1976) (written by 0. Swetnam & D.
Jardine of MITRE Corp.) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY .RATE INITIATIVES].
68. S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, UTILITY PRICING AND SOLAR ENERGY DESIGN 117 (Na-
tional Science Foundation/Research Applied to National Needs, Grant No. APR-75-18006,
1976).
69. Feldman and Anderson found:
Present solar building designs do not generally avail themselves to the ex-
clusive use of off-peak electric power but generally will use a portion of their
auxiliary energy during peak periods. This situation can be remedied by
modifications to the control system, storage and collector size, use patterns
or a combination of these factors. By designing the solar building to utilize
only off-peak energy, the building owner may incur increased capital costs,
these in turn may be offset by a decrease in his energy bill due to the use
of lower cost off-peak electricity.
Id. at 28. This analysis, however, only holds true as a description of heating needs. The
technology for cooling with solar energy is less advanced; solar energy cooling and storage
could be analyzed in the same way but it remains more hypothetical than real. Id. at 1S.
See also Klein, Beckman & Duffle, A Design Procedire for Solar Heating Systems, 18
SOLAR ENERGY 113 (1976).
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Public Service Company's request,70 but following a rehearing the
PUC decided that there were numerous general questions concern-
ing the demand charge schedule that should be addressed in a gen-
eric rate hearing.7 During the interim, the demand charge was left
as an option since some all-electric customers might benefit (rela-
tive to a declining block rate).
Several other rate structures have been proposed that have dif-
ferent implications for solar users. A few utilities have flat rates
for residential customers.7 2 Flat rates are simply a set amount per
unit of energy, regardless of the amount purchased. 73 This rate struc-
ture is neutral with regard to energy savings. However, since de-
mand costs are not charged separately, the solar user may be sub-
sidized by other customers if his needs occur during peak periods.
Lifeline rates have been adopted in a few states.7 4 Under this
system, less is charged for. the first units of energy. Its goal is to
ease the burden on low-income consumers. 75 This rate may inciden-
tally benefit solar users whose needs for supplemental sources of en-
ergy are small enough to fail within the "lifeline" amount.
A final type of utility pricing is interruptible rates. This rate
has traditionally been available only to industries willing to accept
the risk of service interruptions in return for lower rates. Some
studies have pointed out that a solar user willing to accept the risk
of going without utility service on infrequent occasions could save
the utility substantial amounts in capital requirements, justifying a
lower rate.76 If the peak occurred only rarely, this alternative might
be considerably less expensive than additional units of storage or col-
lector area.7 7
2. Legal Response to Rate Discrimination
The legal principles involved in rate regulation are similar to
those discussed for service discrimination. 78 The same prohibitions
on discriminating among customer categories apply, as do the am-
70. In the Matter of Proposed Increased Rates and Charges Contained in Tariff Revi-
sions Filed by Public Serv. Co. of Colo., No. 87460 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Oct. 21.
1975).
71. Home Builders Ass'n of Metropolitan Denver v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., No.
89573 (Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Oct. 26, 1976).
72. E.g., Re Jacksonville Gas Corp., 100 P.U.R.(N.S.) 83, 86 (Fla. R.R. & Pub. Uttl.
Comm'n 1953) (electricity) ; Re City of Helena, 89 P.U.R.(N.S.) 370, 373 (Mont. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1951) (water) ; Re Madison Gas & Electric Co., 5 P.U.R.4th 28, 40 (Wis.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974.) (electricity).
73. "Flat rate" is also used to connote a rate In which the total bill is the sane no
matter how much power is used, as opposed to a rate in which the per kwh charge is the
same no matter how much is used.
74. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 739 (West 1975), as amended, (West Supp. 1977).
75. See 'Lifeline Rates'-Are They Useful?, ENERGY CONSERVATION PROJECT REPORT, No.
4, at 13 (Jan. 1976).
76. E.g., PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE, supra note S. at 155.
77. S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, supra note 61, at 120.
78. See text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
biguities concerning what constitutes "discrimination."
A rate structure that adversely affects solar energy users may
be difficult to challenge under current case law. Several cases have
upheld the legality of rate -structures that subsidize all-electric cus-
tomers, despite antidiscrimination laws. 79 For example, in Rossi v.
Garton,80 a New Jersey court held that an allowance of $150 to any-
one installing electric home heating did not violate the state's anti-
discrimination statute.8' The court interpreted the statute to bar only
"unjust" discriminations, and concluded that only arbitrary discrim-
inations are unjust. The court stated: "If the difference in rates is
based upon a reasonable and fair difference in conditions which
equitably and logically justify a different rate, it is not an unjust
discrimination."
8 2
A New York public utility commission summarized the require-
ments for promotional rate structures as follows:
(1) Promotional inducements may never vary the rates,
charges, rules, and regulations of the tariff pursuant to which
service is rendered to the customer.
(2) Promotional inducements must be uniformly and con-
temporaneously available to all persons within a reasonably
defined group.
(3) The costs of the promotional practices must not be
so large as to impose a burden on customers in general
and must be recoverable through related sales stimulation
within a reasonable period of time.
(4) The size and nature of the allowance or other pro-
motional inducement must be reasonably related to the ob-
jective sought to be achieved and reasonably expected to pro-
mote the interests of the utility and its customers.
8 3
If a rate structure that provides a direct subsidy for the use of one
source of energy is legal, then a rate !structure that incidentally
burderts a competing source of energy is, presumably, also valid.
Such facile judicial acceptance of promotional rate structures
should not be expected in the future. Until the late 1960s, the cost
of power declined with each new power plant. Utilities could there-
fore argue that promotional rate structures would, over time, bring
new business that would justify additional power plants. These new
plants would then lower the bills of all customers of the utility.8'
79. For an example of such a statute, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-1 (1969) ; id. § 48:3-4
(1969), as amended, (Supp. 1976), quoted at text accompanying note 27 supra.
80. 88 N.J. Super. 233, 211 A.2d 806, 60 P.U.R.3d 210 (1965).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:3-1 (1969) ; id. § 48:3-4 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
82. 88 N.J. Super. 233, 236, 211 A.2d 806, 808, 60 P.U.R.3d 210, 212 (1965).
83. Re Promotional Activities by Gas & Electric Corps., 68 P.U.R.3d 162, 170 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1967).
84. 1 A. PRIEST, supra note 26, at 318.
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More recently, inflation, changes in regulatory practices, and in-
creased environmental costs have forced the long-run cost of power
to steadily rise.8 5
In these circumstances, promotional rates lose much of their ap-
peal. A New York court recognized the common impact of rising
fuel prices in a recent decision overturning a subsidy for all-electric
homeowners.86 The subsidy, which was to run for a year, was intend-
ed to lessen the impact of higher electric rates on residential cus-
tomers who had previously been induced to buy all-electric homes
by favorable rates. The court held that the subsidy "constituted un-
due preference and advantage" in violation of the state antidiscrim-
ination law.
87
As a result of this change in financial realities, it may be more
defensible for public utility commissions to grant subsidies for con-
servation than for promotion -of energy consumption. Several utility
commissions have explictly authorized programs to finance the in-
stallation of insulation to conserve natural gas."" Since it can be
reasonably claimed that conservation by some consumers contributes
to the eventual economic benefit of all, earlier precedent in support
of promotional practices should be applicable. Some states have adopt-
ed legislation specifically authorizing conservation programs, elim-
inating any doubt about -their validity.8 9
IV. REGULATORY BURDENS ON MULTI-USER SOLAR SYSTEMS
In some factual settings it will make sense .for several persons
to share the power from a single solar system. Situations where
this may be desirable include: apartment buildings, including con-
dominiums and cooperatives; mobile home parks; district heating
and cooling plants; shopping center complexes; and industrial parks.
A. SCOPE OF PUC JURISDICTION
In most states solar systems would not fall within the jurisdic-
85. From 1956 to 1970, the average cost of electricity in the United States declined from
2.61c per kwh to 2.10c. Since 1970, costs have increased steadily; the average cost per
kwh in 1975 was 3.21c, despite an equally steady rise in consumption during the same
period. Samuelson, supra note 15, at 1475. See also Joskow, Inflation and Environmental
Concern: Structural Changes in the Process of Public Utility Pricing Regulation, 17 J.
LAW & EcoN. 291 (1974).
86. Lefkowitz v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 40 N.Y.2d 1047, -N.E.2d- , 392 N.Y.S.2.d
239 (1976). aff'g, 50 App. Div. 2d 338, 377 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1975).
87. Lefkowitz v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 50 App. Div. 2d 338, -, 377 N.Y.S.2d 671, 674
(1975).
88. E.g., Re Pacific Power & Light Co., 69 P.U.R.3d 367 (Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n
1967); In the Matter of the Application of Mich. Consol. Gas Co. for Authorization of a
Program for the Conservation of Natural Gas, 1 P.U.R.4th 229 (Mich, Pub. Util. Comm'n
1973). Related decisions by public utility commissions have allowed the restriction of
energy to appro-ved uses and the prohibition of energy use by uses considered wasteful.
See notes 55-56 supra and text accompanying.
89. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2781-88 (West 1975), as amended, (West Supp. 1977)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:2-23 (1969), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
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tion of a state Public Utility Commission where those systems are
operated and owned by a single enity on its own property for its
own use (as may be the case with a university heating plant that
services several dormitories and classroom buildings).9o And, to the
extent that joint systems are operated by municipal utilities within
the bounds of the franchising municipality, there should be no PUC
jurisdiction in most states."'
But, if two or more separate entities share a solar system, will
they be subject to the jurisdiction of a state PUC and the various
burdens that accompany such regulation? Any regulatory jurisdic-
tion that does exist over multi-user systems will be at the state
level. Neither the Federal Power Commission nor any other federal
agency has authority to regulate the production, sale, or shipment
of heated or cooled water.
92
At the state level, PUC jurisdiction over multi-user solar sys-
tems will turn on the interpretation of utility commission statutes.
While electric utilities are almost universally regulated, regulation
of utilities supplying heat or cold is not nearly so pervasive. Never-
theless, some states do have statutes granting the PUC jurisdiction
over entities that provide heat or cold to the public. For example,
the definition of public utility in Wisconsin includes every entity
that
may own, operate, manage or control any . plant or equip-
ment or any part of a plant or equipment . . . for the pro-
duction, transmission, delivery or furnishing of heat . . .
either directly or indirectly to or for the public. .... 93
And Illinois law defines a public utility as every entity that
owns, controls, operates or manages within this State, direct-
ly or indirectly, for public use, any plant, equipment or pro-
perty used or to be used for or in connection with, or owns
or controls any franchise, license, permit or right to engage
in:
c. the production, storage, transmission, sale, delivery or fur-
nishing of heat, cold, light, power, electricity or water ... .
90. See notes 95-98 infra, and text accompanying.
91. In many states, municipal utilities are exempt from PUC jurisdiction. E.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 366.02 (1968), repealed by ch. 76-168, § 3 [1976] Fla. Laws .,
effective July 1, 1980. But see iVis. STAT. ANN. § 196.58(5) (1957).
92. Generally, the Federal Power Commission has Jurisdiction only over hydroelectric
plants and the interstate transport and sale of electricity. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824 (1970).
93. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 196.01 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
94. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd 1966), as amended, (Smith-Hurd
SUipp. 1977) (emphasis added).
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In these states the key legal issue on which jurisdiction turns
is whether the heating or cooling entity is providing its services to
the public. In short, a shared solar system will not be found to be
a public utility if its energy is not provided "to the public.".
The majority rule appears to be that a company is serving the
public if it has "dedicated its property to public use."9 5 Such dedi-
cation exists if the entity is serving, or has evidenced a readiness
to serve, an "indefinite public" which has a legal right to receive
service.96 Evidence of dedication to public use includes a willing-
ness to serve all who request service, wide solicitation of customers,
the actual provision of service to all who ask for it, voluntary sub-
mission to state regulation, or an attempt to exercise the power of
eminent domain.9 7 It is important to note that this test does not re-
quire that an entity provide unlimited service to all who apply. It
need only be willing to serve demands within its geographic area
and to the extent of its capacity.98
Under a minority rule, certain activities that do not involve a
dedication of property to public use may nonetheless be "so affected
with the public interest" as to give rise to utility commission juris-
diction. This view has, for example, prevailed in at least one case
involving a shopping center that generated its own electricity.99
It is difficult to predict whether multi-user systems will be sub-
ject to the burdens of PUC regulation. Under the rules discussed
above, it is at least arguable that a multi-user solar system would
fall within PUC jurisdiction in states whose utility statutes purport
to regulate heat and cold. This uncertainty may discourage inves-
tors from developing shared solar systems.
B. CONSEQUENCES OF PUC JURISDICTION
There are several reasons why the owners of a shared solar
95. E.g., Allen v. California R.R. Comm'n, 179 Cal. 68, 175 P. 466 (1918).
96. "The principal determinative characteristic of a public utility is that of service to,
or readiness to serve an indefinite public . . . which has a legal right to demand and re-
ceive its services or commodities." Motor Cargo, Inc. v. Board of Township Trustees, 52
Ohio Op. 257, 258, 117 N.E.2d, 224. 226 (1953). See, e.g., Claypool v. Lightning Delivery
Co., 38 Ariz. 262, 299 P. 126 (1931); Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 P. 1057
(1921); Sutton v. Hunziker, 75 Idaho 395, 272 P.2d 1012 (1954); Peoples Gas L~ight &
Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 132, 134 N.E. 260 (1935) ; Missouri v. Brown, 323 Mo. 818, 19
S.W.2d 1048 (1929); Bricker v. Industrial Gas Co., 58 Ohio App. 101, 16 N.E.2d 218
(1937); Limestone Rural Tel. Co. v. Best, 56 Okla. 85, 155 P. 901 (1916); Schumacher
v. Railroad Comm'n, 185 Wis. 303, 201 N.W. 241 (1924) ; Cawkes v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320,
133 N.W. 157 (1911) ; Re Na'e, 4 P.U.R.3d 369 (Ohio Pub. Util. Comm'n 1953). See gen-
erally Priest, Some Bases of Public Utility Regulation, 36 Miss. L.J. 18 (1965).
97. See Dow CHEM. CO., ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH INST. OF MICH., TowNSEND-GREEN-
SPAN & CO. AND CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE, ENERGY INDUSTRIAL CENTER STUDY 373 and
cases cited therein (precared for the Office of Energy Research & Development Policy,
National Science Foundation, Grant No. OEP 74-20242, June 1975).
98. E.g., Camp Rincon Resort Co. v. Eshleman, 172 Cal. 561, 158 P. 186 (1916); Higgs
v. City of Fort Pierce, 118 So. 2d 5S2 (Fla. 1960); State Pub. Tjtil. Comm'n v. Bethany
Mut. Tel. Ass'n, 270 III. 183, 110 N.E. 334 (1915).
99. Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440 F.2d 36
(10th Cir. 1971).
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system should fear PUC jurisdiction. If a shared solar system is
found to be a public utility, it must file reports and accounts, 100
serve all customers who demand service within a given area, 10 sub-
mit its rate schedules to the PUC for approval,1 0 2 continue provid-
ing service until given permission to discontinue,' 0 3 provide safe and
adequate service,' 04 and comply with limitations on the issuance of
securities.105
Perhaps the most significant burden that PUC jurisdiction would
place on shared solar systems would be the duty to apply for certif-
icates of public convenience and necessity. State utility regulatory
statutes universally require that every public utility must obtain a
certificate before beginning operation or even construction of its
equipment.0 G Not only are certification proceedings often long and
expensive, but the PUCs use the certification process to protect the
monopoly of existing utilities. The general rule is that an existing
utility shall be given a monopoly in its area unless the public con-
venience and necessity require otherwise. In practice this means that
a new utility is almost never permitted in an area already served
by an existing utility. Even where the existing utility is providing
woefully inadequate and inefficient service, it will be permitted to
exercise monopoly control over its service area if it promises to cor-
rect its shortcomings.' 0
The obvious question is whether a multi-user solar system found
to be a public utility will be certified to provide heat and cold to
areas being served by existing utilities. If the existing utility already
provides heat and cold, the answer is fairly simple-the existing util-
ity will probably be permitted to retain its monopoly in the absence
of some overwhelming reason to the contrary.
The question is more problematical where the existing utility is
providing heat and cold indirectly (by selling gas or electricity). In
such instances, there appears to be little justification for denying
certification to the shared solar system. A recent study completed
for the Energy Research and Development Administration concludes
that there is substantial case precedent for certifying solar energy
systems despite the fact that conventional facilities exist for provid-
ing heat and cold.' 0 The precedents cited in the ERDA study sug-
100. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.05(1) (1968).
101. See notes 47-56 supra, and text accompanying.
102. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 454 (West 1975), as arinded, (West Supp. 1977).
103. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.81 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1976).
104. E.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 761 (Vest 1975).
105. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.04 (1968), as avmevded, (Supp. 1976), repealed by ch.
76-168, § 3 [1976] Fla. Laws , - , effective July 1, 1980.
106. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, § 56 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
107. See, e.g., Kentucky Util. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 252 S.W.2d 885 (Ky. Ct. App.
1952) ; W. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 347 n.2 (1967).
108. WILSON, JONES, MORTON & LYNCH, THE SUN: A MUNICIPAL UTILITY ENERGY SOURCE
5-6 (1976) (prepared under an agreement with the city of Santa Clara, Cal., with the sup-
port of ERDA).
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gest that new energy forms should be permitted to compete with
existing energy forms if the new form is cheaper, cleaner, or in some
way more efficient. An electric light company, for example, was
certified despite the existence of an acetylene light company, on the
ground that the electric company provided a new and different serv-
ice. 100 A gas company was certified for the same region served by
an electric plant, although it would serve the same needs as the
electric plant. The certification was justified because gas was cheap-
er and different."10 Similarly, because an electric railway offers a
different form of motive power than a steam railway, an electric
railway won certification where a steam railway was already avail-
able."1 Finally, several decisions allowed the certification of natural
gas companies. 1 2 In one case the court said that natural gas was
cleaner and more serviceable than manufactured gas.' 3
Despite these precedents supporting certification of solar public
utilities i'n areas served by competing utilities, it is clearly within
the authority of some PUCs to deny certification. The mere possibil-
ity of PUC jurisdiction over shared solar facilities, and the threat
that such jurisdiction may be used to prevent operation of the facil-
ities, is a substantial barrier to the development of joint solar sys-
tems.
There are several obvious ways to eliminate these threats. The
first, and simplest, would be for PUCs to declare that they will not
choose to exercise jurisdiction over solar heating and cooling plants.
This raises the question of whether utilities threatened by competi-
tion from the solar plants can compel the PUC to exercise its juris-
diction. This issue is likely to hinge 'on statutory construction issues:
first, whether the challenged activity is a public utility; and second,
whether the PUC may or must exercise jurisdiction over a public
utility.
Because PUCs may be forced to assert jurisdiction over shared
facilities, legislative action may be the only feasible approach. Leg-
islative action may take several forms. A law might simply state
that the public interest demands that shared solar facilities be per-
mitted to compete with existing utilities. Such an approach would
not preclude PUC regulation of other aspects of joint solar heating
and cooling plants. A more drastic approach would be for the legis-
lature to completely exempt solar facilities from PUC jurisdiction.
A related proposal has been put before the California legislature.
109. Re Markham, 1916A P.U.R. 1007, 1012 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1915).
110. Re Gas Fuel Service, 3 P.U.R. (N.S.) 55, 60 (Cal. R.R. Comm'n 1933).
111. Southern Pac. Co. v. San Francisco-Sacramento R.R., 1929A P.U.R. 116, 122 (Cal.
R.R. Comm'n 1928).
112. E.g., Re North Dakota Consumers Gas Co., 30 P.U.R.(N.S.) 9 (N.D. Bd. R.R.
Comm'rs 1939); Lukens Steel Co. v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 25 P.U.R.(N.S.)
20 (Penn. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1938).
113. McFayden v. Public Util. Consol. Corp., 50 Idaho 561, 299 P. 671 (1930).
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[A] person (a) using a power source other than a convention-
al power source for generating electricity solely for his own
use and not for resale to others, except to an electric util-
ity, and utilizing a transmission service . . . shall not be sub-
ject to regulation by the commission as a public utility.
114
While this bill applies only to electrical generators, it could easily
be broadened to encompass suppliers of heat and cold. Finally, the
United States Congress could pass legislation to preempt state regu-
lation of solar energy facilities. As discussed above, such preemptive
action appears to be within Congress's authority, but is unlikely.
V. PUBLIC UTILITIES AND SOLAR COMMERCIALIZATION
The discussion so far has been confined to the role of utilities
in providing backup service to solar energy users. An equally signifi-
cant possibility is the direct involvement of utilities in the solar en-
ergy market. Utility participation might come in a variety of forms,
ranging from simply financing homeowners' purchases of collectors,
an approach used in some states to help homeowners install insula-
tion,"I5 to the actual provision of solar collectors by utilities as an
alternative form of energy service.
Many utilities are already considering such programs. The South-
ern California Gas Company, for example, is testing the use of solar
assisted gas heating for apartment buildings."1G Other utilities are
also experimenting with solar energy, 1 7 and the utility-funded Elec-
tric Power Research Institute has a division devoted exclusively to
solar energy projects. 1 8
A. DESIRABILITY OF UTILITY PARTICIPATION IN THE SOLAR MARKET
The merit of utility participation in the solar market is a hotly
contested issue.'u Utility advocates point to several possible advan-
tages.
First, although solar energy utilizes the "free" energy from
the sun, it requires additional first or capital cost. Since the
construction industry is highly "first-cost intensive," we ex-
pect that solar energy will have some difficulty finding ear-
114. A.D. 4069, Cal. Legis. 1975-76 Reg. Sess.
115. See note 88 supra, and text accompanying.
116. See note 5 supra.
117. A recent survey found more than 100 electric utilities supporting solar energy re-
search. Most of these projects involved the use of solar energy for heating and cooling
buildings. ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INST., SURVEY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY SOLAR PROJECTS
(ER 321-SR, 1977).
118. For a description of Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) solar research
projects, see EPRI, SOLAR ENERGY, FALL 1976 (EPRI Research Project 549, 1976). A sum-
mary Is also provided in PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE, supra note 3, at 27-32.
119. See generally PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE, supra note 3; ENERGY
RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 67.
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ly, rapid acceptance. A utility company is used to high first-
cost (capital intensive) business ventures. Utility company
sponsorship in the "lease to the user" mode will do a lot
to reduce this barrier . . .
Second, the sponsorship of a utility company may help
overcome market "fragmentation." If the utility company
buys the equipment and leases it in a large-scale fashion,
the solar industry will face at least one aggregated market
(to the gas company). This may provide a large enough in-
centive to actively stimulate a solar energy system fabrica-
tion industry.
Third, because a utility company already has a sales/
distribution/service network which operates within the hous-
ing industry, the Utility Company scenario provides a way
of "product fitting" solar energy systems.
Finally, because of the traditional anti-innovation bias
within the industry (a bias which is quite understandable
given the industry environment), utility company sponsorship
will help overcome some of the traditional "instituti'onal-cul-
tural biases" against solar energy which exist within the
housing industry.
120
On the other hand, utility critics have been quick to raise the
spectre of utility "ownership of the sun," with the attendant evils
of "excessive profit-taking and monopolistic favoritism in equipment
purchases.''121 While some of this opposition no doubt arises from
ideological beliefs, specialists in utility economics have also raised
serious questions about the desirability of using utilities to promote
solar energy. Roger Noll, although he ultimately concludes that a
limited form of utility involvement may be desirable,"12 notes two
dangers.
[A] regulated utility has an incentive to invest in solar
technology that is too durable, that is excessively efficient
in converting sunlight to usable energy, and that requires in-
efficiently little maintenance. If permitted this would lead to
excessive costs and prices for solar energy, and inefficiently
slow adoption of the technology.
Second, regulated utilities can use solar technology stra-
tegically to recapture some of the monopoly profits that reg-
ulation takes away and to foreclose competition in the solar
energy business. 1"3
120. Hirshberg & Schoen, Barriers to the Widespread Utiizotion of Residential Solar
Energy: The Prospects for Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry, 5 POL'Y SCI. 453,
468 (1974).
121. See note 24 supra.
122. R. Noll, Public Utilities and Solar Energy Development (1976) (unpublished, paper
on file with the authors), reprinted in PUBLIC UTILITY & SDLAR ENnRGy INTERFACE, supra
note 3, at 176 [citations to Noll's paper will hereinafter be made to the reprinted version].
123. Id. at 183.
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A compromise suggested by some utility critics is the use of
publicly-owned utilities, which are considered more amenable to pub-
lic control. 124 Even if this approach avoids some of the perverse in-
centives that exist for regulated, privately-owned utilities, too few
public utilities exist to make it a realistic option.
While these issues will undoubtedly be debated by economists
for years to come, it is likely that -some utilities will enter the solar
market. Unless the political strength of utility opponents becomes
substantially stronger, utilities should be able to convince their reg-
ulators of the desirability of what can be portrayed as an energy
conservation program. The economic grounds for opposing the con-
cept are sufficiently complex and esoteric to justify a decision either
way. Moreover, gas utilities will have a strong incentive to under-
take such activities because of the declining availability of their prod-
uct. Without some new source of energy services, gas firms face
the prospect of steadily declining reserves.
B. REGULATING UTILITY PARTICIPATION IN THE SOLAR MARKET
It is appropriate to examine the legal framework in which util-
ity participation in the solar market will be regulated. Several al-
ternative regulatory policies will be discussed, and their legal con-
sequences distinguished.12 -5 First, utilities might ask for a monopoly
on the distribution of solar systems. They might hope to do this by
denying backup energy to persons not using utility-supplied solar
equipment. The utility could either rent or sell the equipment to the
customer, but no other business could market competitive systems.
Such a program would be extremely controversial; the necessary reg-
ulatory approval is unlikely. It is difficult to imagine any justifica-
tion for the creation of a monopoly in solar equipment sales. In con-
trast, the generation of electricity is a natural monopoly that re-
quires regulation to substitute for price competition.'1 2 G Conceivably,
electric utilities could argue that the use of solar collectors for heat-
ing so strongly affects the reliability of their systems that regula-
tory control over their use is justified. However, this issue could be
addressed through appropriate rate structures.
Exclusive marketing rights would also probably run afoul of fed-
eral antitrust laws or state policies against anticompetitive practices.
The Supreme Court decision, Cantor v. Detroit Edison, discussed pre-
viously, limited state activity to provide exemptions if the challenged
124. See notes 24-25 supra, and text accompanying. See also ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION
FOUNDATION, TAKING CHARGE: A NEW LOOK AT PUBLIC POWER (1976).
125. This delineation follows that used in PUBLIC UTILITY & SOLAR ENERGY INTERFACE,
supra note 8, at 178-81.
126. See 1 A. KOHN, .supra note 11, at 11-12.
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activity is central to the purposes of a state's regulatory program.
1 2t
The light bulb exchange program under attack failed to meet the
test since "there is no reason to believe that [without the program]
Michigan's regulation of its electric utilities will no longer be able
to function effectively. ' 128 A regulatory authority would have to offer
a more convincing rationale for a program that even more clearly
contravened federal antitrust principles.
It is far more likely that utilities will be allowed to compete
with other distributors, than that they will be granted exclusive mar-
keting rights. Utilities' sales programs could be handled as a part
of the utilities' regulated services, or through independent, separate
subsidiaries. Precedents exist for both arrangements. For example,
Pacific Telephone in California leased and installed mobile radio tel-
ephones for a number of years as an independent business. The com-
pany eventually decided that regulation was desirable, and filed an
application with the state PUC. The commission accepted jurisdic-
tion, and the service became a regulated business in competition
with other unregulated concerns.
A utility is likely to view a regulated mode as most desirable
because of the opportunities for cost sharing and risk spreading.
Stated in terms favorable to the utility, it has, been observed as fol-
lows:
A regulated utility may be able to overcome [some of the
initial market resistance to solar energy] . . . if it is permit-
ted, through rates it charges its customers, to spread at least
some of the costs associated with its solar energy program
among all of its customers and thereby reduce the unit cost
to those persons who choose to utilize solar devices or sys-
tems.
129
On the other hand, utility critics have suggested other possible in-
centives, in the opportunity for manipulation of expenses between
the regulated and unregulated markets.
Because the utility is always more expert than the regula-
tor on the technical and economic conditions facing the firm,
a technological advance that prdvides more flexibility in
firm operations can be used strategically by the utility to
work a better deal from the regulated market. For example,
a joint solar/gas utility would have to work out a method to
127. 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
128. Id. at 3118. Compare with Gas Light Co. of Columbus v. Georgia Power Co.. 440
F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971) (electric utility rates and practices immune from private anti-
trust suit where PUC gave lengthy consideration. to challenged activities); Washington
Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971) (electric utility
rate preference for underground transmission lines immune from private anti-trust even
though PUC did not specifically approve).
129. J. Lake, Legal Aspects of the Use of Solar Energy for Water and Space Heating
17-18 (1976) (unpublished paper on file with the authors).
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allocate its costs between solar-assigned and gas-only serv-
ices. If it could succeed in effectuating an allocation that, in
fact, attributed too much cost to gas, it would succeed in
taking advantage of its monopoly in the gas business to sub-
sidize its solar energy business. 13 0
It is questionable whether the use of an unregulated subsidiary
is any less subject to manipulation than a regulated component of a
utility. In both situations, common expenses will be incurred for such
things as advertising, equipment, etc., that could be allocated to ei-
ther the utility or its solar business. Nor is there any inherent rea-
son why accounting requirements should be any different simply be-
cause of the status of the solar entity. The process of allocating costs
will require value judgments in either case; one man's accounting
trick is another's example of a natural advantage.
Indeed, the principal reason for seeking utility participation in
the solar business is the existence of economic advantages, such as
access to the capital market at more favorable interest rates, a de-
veloped distribution and billing system for energy services, and other
relevant expertise. As long as these natural advantages are not
abused through tying agreements or other illegal arrangements, no
harm is done.
Whether or not the solar business is regulated, close scrutiny
by the public utilities commission will be desirable. The regulatory
process is certainly accustomed to the notion of cost sharing. Life-
line rates, for example, diverge from simple cost-of-service princi-
ples, but are justified by other social objectives. The conservation
of nonrenewable resources could easily be recognized as a benefit
to all consumers of the utility, and therefore warrant some sharing
of expenses from the solar business.1 31 In any case, such cost shar-
ing is likely to be tightly constrained by federal antitrust laws. Util-
ity practices that are, not explicitly authorized by utility commissions
and are not clearly related to energy conservation objectives will be
vulnerable to treble damage suits, a very effective weapon. Any effort
to destroy competition by selling below market rates would certainly
be challenged. 132
In addition to antitrust 6onsiderations, another important legal
issue is the scope of PUC jurisdiction over a solar business. Competi-
tors of a utility entering the solar business are likely to contest PUC
jurisdiction. They would hope to prevent the utility from obtaining
the advantages associated with a regulated rate of return. This is
likely to be particularly important in the early stages of the solar
market, when small differences in price may be far less important
130. R. Noll, supra note 122, at 183-84.
131. J. Lake, supra note 129, at 17-18.
132. G. TURNER, supra note 26, at 407-09.
354
UTILITIES OF A SOLAR AGE
to consumers than questions of reliability and performance guar-
antees.
The broad legal issues surrounding the exercise of PUC juris-
diction are described in the preceding section on regulatory burdens.
Initially, there is a question of statutory construction-whether the
service falls within the businesses enumerated by the state code.
Thus, jurisdiction could be based on a provision in the statute for
the regulation of "heat services" or, less directly, on the ground
that such services are undertaken "in connection with or to facil-
itate" the utility's primary business. In the case of solar energy,
for example, it could be argued that the impact of solar energy use
on the utility's service is so great that combined regulated service
is in the public interest.
The difficulty of drawing clear boundaries in this area is illus-
trated by the California case involving the exercise of jurisdiction
by the California PUC over the rental and service of mobile radio
telephones by Pacific Telephone.133 The company had for some years
offered the same service on an unregulated basis. At the company's
request, the PUC accepted jurisdiction and a private competitor ap-
pealed. A divided California Supreme Court approved jurisdiction
on the ground that the service was closely related to the com-
pany's regulated businesses. 3 4 As the court interpreted the statute,
the most relevant issue was the use to which the technology was to be
applied. Because telephone communication was intended, the service
fell within the statute. Presumably, a similar argument could be
made on behalf of regulating solar equipment as an energy service
within the broad meaning of the statute. However, the issue is so
borderline that the otttcome is likely to rest on the wording of dif-
ferent statutes and the attitude of specific regulatory agencies and
reviewing courts.
C. RESTRICTING UTILITY PARTICIPATION IN THE SOLAR MAR-
KET
An alternative to utility participation in the solar energy market
would be to restrict such activities as much as possible. The extent
to which such prohibitions could be imposed also depends on the
ability of a PUC to assert jurisdiction over the offending activity.
There is no legal basis for seeking jurisdiction unless the challenged
activity affects the utility's regulated business.1 35 However, it seems
likely that a sufficient nexus between solar energy and other energy
services exists to justify jurisdiction if the PUC chooses to exercise it.
133. Commercial Communications, Inc. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 512,
327 P.2d 513 (1958).
134. Id. at -, 327 P.2d at 522.
135. See G. TURNER, $upra note 26, at 20.
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As a mixed question of fact and law, the agency's judgment is like-
ly to receive only limited deference.
On the other hand, there are instances where utility companies
were essentially forced to accept limitations on their outside activi-
ties. AT&T, for example, accepted a limitation on unregulated busi-
nesses as part of a settlement to an antitrust suit in 1956.136 The
New York Public Service Commission limited participation by utili-
ties in solid waste disposal to expenditures for modifications of, or
additions to, boiler equipment and the purchase cost of processed
solid waste fuel. The utilities were willing to accept such restrictions
to avoid being stuck with a larger bill. 137 Even where regulatory
commissions lack direct leverage, they have other means of exert-
ing influence. Opposing the preferences of the PUC is bad business
from the utility standpoint.'
D. UTILITIES AS FINANCIERS IN THE SOLAR MARKET
As a final alternative to the distribution of solar equipment, util-
ities might undertake to act simply as financiers or insurers. This
would be an undesirable role for the utility, since the utility must as-
sume all the risks, but do so without the benefit of financial profit
from inclusion of solar expenses in its rate base. Borrowing for solar
purposes would also compete with more profitable utility programs,
thereby increasing their tremendous capital needs. There are prec-
edents in the insulation financing programs discussed earlier, 138 but
the amount of money that would be involved in solar systems is
substantially greater-insulation is usually a matter of a few hun-
dred dollars, whereas a solar system costs several thousand dollars
or more.
An assertive PUC might try to force a utility to finance solar
purchases. The utility's certificate of operation is a license subject
to conditions on whatever terms the regulatory agency believes nec-
essary. 139 A reluctant utility might be ordered to finance public pur-
chase of solar collectors much like utilities have been ordered to use
expensive technology to reduce air pollution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In each of the three areas discussed, regulatory jurisdiction, ser-
136. United States v. Western Elec. & AT&T, 13 RAD. REG. (P-H) 2143, [1956] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) paras. 71, 134 (D.N.J. 1956) (consent judgment).
137. P. MEIER & T. McCoy, SOLID WASTE AS AN ENERGY SOURCE FOR THE NORTHEAST 96
(prepared for ERDA, No. 50550, 1976).
138. See notes 88-89 supra, and text accompanying.
139. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-111 (1974), id. § 40-4-102 (1974). This power Is
frequently exercised in the context of environmental controls; the PUC may license a
new facility subject to the condition that it meet all air pollution. standards, which require
the use of expensive sulphur-removal technology for coal-fired plants. See Pawnee Plant
for Morgan Stirs Up Verbal Dust, Denver Post, May 9, 1976, at 18.
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vice and rate discrimination, and utility participation in the solar mar-
ket, significant uncertainty exists concerning appropriate regulatory
policies and the impact of current law. From the perspective of con-
servationists and solar energy advocates, this problem is compound-
ed by differences among utilities and states. Very few generaliza-
tions are possible. Examining these issues for each utility could be
slow, complex, and expensive. This situation could very well impede
the commercialization ard acceptance of solar energy systems. Util-
ities are not likely to risk significant sums without some assurance
of protection from the antitrust laws. Other distributors may be re-
luctant to start their own retail business if utilities are expected to
enter the market. Homeowners will want to know the net cost and
savings of their solar systems, a calculation that depends on expec-
tations about future rate structures and available sources of auxil-
.iary energy. Builders of multi-family dwellings may think twice
about installing a solar system if they may be subject to PUC reg-
ulation.
The time is clearly ripe for legislation and administrative atten-
tion to these questions. There are actions that should be taken by
the federal government, state governments, and public utility com-
missions. The federal government should address those technical is-
sues, such as appropriate methodologies for evaluating the impact
of solar systems on utility load patterns, that are common to
every state and utility. This is already being done to some extent.
For example, several studies have been funded by the federal gov-
ernment. 140 But a larger, more systematic effort in cooperation with
utility regulators and utility representatives seems appropriate. The
federal government should also offer a clearinghouse for technical
information and assist states in the formulation of policy agendas.
State legislatures must decide the broad policy issues involved
in solar utility relationships. For example, a decision to subsidize
the use of solar collectors can be clarified by technical studies on
the effect of direct incentives for energy conservation. Political judg-
ments must also be made about the importance of such unquanti-
fiable benefits as conservation of nonrenewable fuels and reduced de-
pendence on fossil fuels. Moreover, a political decision must be made
on the relative merits of different forms of incentives-tax credits
or loan subsidies may be a more equitable and efficient approach
than the use of utility rate structures. Since these alternatives are
not available to PUCs, state legislatures must make these choices.
The federal government may also play a role in this area.
Within the broad policy established by the state, considerable
140. E.g., ENERGY RATE INITIATIVES, supra note 67; S. FELDMAN & B. ANDERSON, aupra
note 68.
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discretion must still be exercised by public utility commissions. The
specifics of rate structures, scope of regulatory jurisdiction, and par-
ticular utility programs are too technical to be decided by legisla-
tive bodies. Until recently, any expectation that PUCs would volun-
tarily address such questions with more than a rubber stamp for
utility proposals was unrealistic. Fortunately, the increasing political
interest in utility regulatory decisions has made many of these agen-
cies much more responsive. Still, such assertiveness remains
the exception rather than the rule. To assure resolution of these is-
sues through administrative processes, state legislation should re-
quire PUCs to investigate and recommend appropriate policies, sub-
ject to legislative review.
These recommendations are obviously directed more to the proc-
ess of decision making than to substantive solutions for the issues
we have raised. Unfortunately, the issues defy simple universal an-
swers. The most important short-term need is to alleviate the uncer-
tainty in the existing regulatory environment. The general approaches
we have suggested would go far to meet this need.
